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The Fourteenth Amendment: The Framers'
Design
RAOUL BERGER*
"[L]egal history still has its claims."**
In an address before the Feltows of the American Bar Foun-
dation, the Honorable Patricia Roberts Harris, Secretary of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development, did me the
honor of singling out my recent Government by Judiciary: The
Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment as a threat to the
application of "constitutional principles to all segments of the
society."' And she intimated that my commentary is among the
"attacks of those who resent the court's protection of the minori-
ties."2 As a lawyer she should, I suggest, allow that a fellow law-
yer, devoted these many years to scholarly studies, may seek to
rise above his predilections in his devotion to constitutionalism.
Back in 1942 I wrote of a decision by the then "reconstructed
Court," which engaged my deepest sympathies, that I liked it no
better when Justice Black read my predilections into the Consti-
tution than when Justices Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
Van Devanter read in theirs.3
To her indictment that I insist that "constitutional law must
stick to the fundamentals, to the written language of the Consti-
tution itself, and the historical record of the times in which these
words were written,"4 that "[tihe courts . . . cannot tamper
* Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley, 1962-65; Charles Warren
Senior Fellow in American Legal History, Harvard University, 1971-76. A.B. 1932, Univer-
sity of Cincinnati; J.D. 1935, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1938, Harvard University.
** Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 609 (1942)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1. Address by Patricia R. Harris, American Bar Association, Midyear Meeting, in
New Orleans, Feb. 1977, reprinted in 30 S.C.L. Rav. 485 (1979) [hereinafter cited as P.
HARms].
2. Id. at 489.
3. Berger, Constructive Contempt: A Post Mortem, 9 U. CH. L. REv. 602, 604-05, 641-
42 (1942).
4. P. HARmS, supra note 1, at 488. Justice Black stated, "it is language and history
that are the crucial factors which influence me in interpreting the Constitution-not
reasonableness or desirability as determined by Justices of the Supreme Court." H.
BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 8, 10 (1968). In a striking affirmation contemporary with
the fourteenth amendment, "a unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report [January
25, 18721, signed by senators who had voted for the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments in Congress" declared:
'In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it such interpretation
as will secure the result which was intended to be accomplished by those who
1
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with social policy because they were never granted such power,"5
I plead guilty. The materials relied on by Secretary Harris to
counter these propositions are, as will appear, a compound of
wishful thinking and remarkably unhistorical inferences.
While Secretary Harris largely focuses on desegregation, a
subject to which only 16 of my 450 pages are devoted,' I concen-
trated chiefly on the Court's "one person-one vote" doctrine in
light of the framers' intention to exclude suffrage from the ambit
of the fourteenth amendment and leave control thereof with the
states.' The virtually incontrovertible evidence on this score led
me to conclude that the "one person-one vote" doctrine repre-
sents a 180 degree revision of the amendment. Whence, I asked,
does the Court derive power to displace the choices of the framers
and to amend the Constitution, and I went on to demonstrate
that the power was plainly withheld. Addressing this very issue,
Justice Harlan declared: "When the Court disregards the express
intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the
realm of the political process to which the amending power was
committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which
it is its highest duty to protect.""
Analysis must proceed from the facts, but space permits re-
cital of only a few out of the host of facts on which my thesis is
based. In 1865-68, Justice Brennan stated, seventeen northern
states rejected black suffrage.' Consequently, Roscoe Conkling,
a member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction of both
Houses, which drafted the amendment, stated:
framed it and the people who adopted it.*... A conclusion which should give
the phrase 'a republican form of government'. . . a meaning differing from the
sense in which it was understood and employed by the people when they
adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the
plain and express language of the Constitution in any other particular. This is
the rule of interpretation adopted by all commentators on the Constitution, and
in all judicial expositions of that instrument ....'
A. AVINs, RECONSTRUCrION AMENDMENTR' DEBATEs 2, 571 (1967).
Secretary Harris' interpretive approach represents the recent attempt to rationalize
the segregation decision, but as former Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. said, the activists would
"interpret the Constitution to mean what it would have said if they, instead of the Found-
ing Fathers, had written it." Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 10, col. 4.
5. P. HARius, supra note 1, at 488.
6. R. BERGER, GovENMENT BY JUDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION oF THE FouwrEENTH
AMENDMENT 117-33 (1977). Instead of citing to the sources, I shall throughout cite to the
pages of my book where they are quoted, both in the interest of space conservation and of
calling attention to the confirmatory materials there set out.
7. Id. at 52-116.
8. Quoted in id., at 333.
9. Quoted in R. BERGER supra note 6, at 90.
496 [Vol. 30
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The northern states, most of them, do not permit negroes to
vote. Some of them have repeatedly and lately pronounced
against it. Therefore, even if it were defensible as a principle for
the Central Government to 'absorb by amendment the power to
control the action of the states in such a matter, would it not
be futile to ask three-quarters of the States to do for themselves
and others, by ratifying such 4n amendment, the very thing
most of them have already refused to do in their own cases?'
Senator Jacob Howard, a member of the Joint Committee, who
explained the amendment to the Senate, said that "three-fourths
of the States . . .could not be induced to grant the right of
suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction, to the co-
lored race."" That is confirmed by the Report of the Joint Com-
mittee, which stated that the states would not "surrender a power
they had exercised, and to which they were attached," therefore
it was thought best to "leave the whole question with the people
of each State."' 2 Hence resort was had to section 2 of the amend-
ment that permits states to deny suffrage, but to suffer a reduc-
tion of representation in the House of Representatives in conse-
quence. These and many other confirmatory statements in the
debates led me to conclude with Justice Harlan that "one per-
son-one vote" lacked all historical justification. Professor Ger-
ald Gunther recently wrote that "most constitutional lawyers
agree."' 3
The materials bearing on segregation are not nearly so co-
pious, but they are clear enough for the reason given by the late
Alexander Bickel:
It was preposterous to worry about unsegregated schools, for
example, when hardly a beginning had been made at educating
Negroes at all and when obviously special efforts, suitable only
for the Negroes, would have to be made. . .It is impossible to
conclude that the 39th Congress intended that segregation be
abolished; impossible also to conclude that they foresaw it
might be, under the language they were adopting."
A few confirmatory facts must suffice. James Wilson, chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee and House Manager for the
10. Id. at 58-59. Conkling's reference to the "Central Government" reflects a perva-
sive attachment to state sovereignty. Id. at 60-64.
11. Id. at 56.
12. Id. at 84.
13. Gunther, Book Review, Wall St. J., Nov. 5, 1977, at 4, col. 4.
14. Quoted in R. BORGER, supra note 6 at 100.
19791
3
Berger: The Fourteenth Amendment: the Framers' Design
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Civil Rights Bill-the antecedent of the amendment, which was
designed to protect and embody the ensuing Civil Rights
Act' 5-advised the House that the words "civil rights. . . do not
mean that all citizens shall sit on juries, or that their children
shall attend the same schools. These are not civil rights."'6 Mani-
festly this was designed to reassure restive framers that desegre-
gation was excluded from the Bill. Senator Charles Sumner,
leader of a radical fringe, unavailingly sought to "abolish segre-
gated Negro schools in the District of Columbia.' 7 With good
reason did Judge E. Barrett Prettyman hold that congressional
support for segregated schools in the District of Columbia
contemporaneously with the adoption of the amendment was
conclusive evidence that Congress had not intended § 1 of the
Amendment to invalidate school segregation laws.'8 The Senate
galleries themselves were segregated.'" The inescapable fact is
that racism held the North in thrall. A leading Radical, George
Julian of Indiana, stated during the debates that "[t]he real
trouble is we hate the Negro.'"" There were other such utter-
ances;' racism remains a stubborn fact today. As Justice Jack-
son's file memorandum in the course of the desegregation case
states, "Neither North nor South has been willing to adapt its
racial practices to its professions."' ' "It was into this moral void,"
Richard Kluger wrote, "that the Supreme Court under Earl War-
ren now stepped, ' 24 not to give effect to a national consensus.
To counter such proofs,2 5 Secretary Harris turns to the
"overriding concern of the framers . . . with the protection of
15. Id. at 22-23.
16. Id. at 118; see note 71 infra.
17. Id. at 123.
18. Id. at 123-24.
19. Id. at 125.
20. Quoted in id. at 91.
21. Id. at 13.
22. Roger Wilkins, a prominent black journalist, writes, "The attitude of whites
towards blacks is basic in this country. And that attitude has changed for the worse." N.Y.
Times, Mar. 3, 1978, § A, at 26, col. 1. Chester Finn wrote that the issue of racial
discrimination "has been fanned into the most protracted, rancorous, and divisive domes-
tic blaze of the post-war era." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 328. Today the
national mood "opposes aggressive attempts by racial minorities to gain a larger share of
the political and economic pie." N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1978, § A, at 5, col. 1.
23. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 133.
24. Id.
25. Even devout activists concede that the framers' exclusion of suffrage and segrega-
tion from the scope of the amendment is all but incontrovertible. See Alfange, Book
Review, 5 HAST NGS CONST. L. Q. 603, 606-07 (1978); Nathanson, Book Review, 56 Tax.
L. REv. 579, 580-81 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L. Rv. 685, 687-91 (1978).
[Vol. 30
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minorities."2 First she invokes Hamilton, who "would brook no
possibility of rule by majority fiat. 'The mass of the people,' he
said, 'seldom judges and determines right.' ",27 But she overlooks
where he drew the line-between "the mass of the people" and
"the rich and well born."28 To keep the masses in check he pro-
posed an analogue to the British king and House of Lords, an
executive and senate who would serve for life, to "check the im-
prudence of democracy" and "form a permanent barrier agst.
every pernicious innovation." 9 In a word he would protect the
propertied classes by means of a wealthy oligarchy. Madison
also is called to witness by Secretary Harris as safeguarding
"'the rights of minor parties'" against the "'superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority' ";30 but he too feared "'leg-
islative democracy.' "31 More important, he emphasized that the
conflict of interest between North and South arose out of the
"institution of slavery & its consequences formed the line of dis-
crimination. ' 32 To "defend" Southern interests he proposed
that the move to give the South representation in the House of
Representatives by computing the voteless slaves in the ratio
of 5 to 3, be increased to five fifths!33 Gouverneur Morris ob-
jected on the ground that if slaves are "men" they should be
made citizens and permitted to vote, and if "property," "[wihy
then is no other property included?" '3 4 Morris perceived that
the 3/5 proportional representation gave a slaveholder more
votes than the owner of a New England farm, and it was in fact
the instrument whereby the slavocracy fastened its grip on the
federal government. 5 Madison is hardly the man to cite for
protection of the black minority.
Next Secretary Harris invokes Jefferson: had he been present
at the drafting of the Constitution, he "would have agreed with
the need to protect the minority."36 Although Jefferson held
26. P. HAmuS, supra note 1, at 488.
27. P. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 486.
28. 1 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 299 (1911)
[hereinafter cited as M. FARRAND].
29. Id. at 288-89, 299.
30. P. HARms, supra note 1, at 486.
31. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTrurION 159 (1978).
32. 2 M. FARRAND, .supra note 28, at 10.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2(3); 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 486.
34. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 222.
35. The 3/5 formula gave the South 25 additional members, and enabled "the slave
power to keep its grip on the nation." S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINcY ADAMS AND THE UNION 417,
466 (1956).
36. P. HARMS, supra note 1, at 486.
19791
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slaves, he predicted emancipation, but wrote, "it is equally cer-
tain that the two races will never live in a state of equal freedom
• . . so insurmountable are the barriers which nature, habit and
opinions have established between them."3 Then Secretary Har-
ris goes on to state, "[s]o clear was the constitutional intent to
protect minorities that in the early years of the Republic Calhoun
devised a doctrine of concurrent minorities . . ... 3 But as Sam-
uel Eliot Morison observed, "Calhoun's conception of liberty,
which he held more dear than union, was the liberty of the slave-
owner to the full product of his slave's labor, and his right to full
protection by the federal government."39 Hamilton et al were not
delineating minority rights, but advocating a governmental
structure that would serve to brake assaults on property by the
"turbulent democracy"; they sought domination by the proper-
tied minority.
Whatever "protection for minorities" meant, it did not com-
prehend the black slaves; in the eyes of the slavocracy they were
"property," chattels entitled to little or no protection." There is
no blinking the fact that the Constitution was a "racist docu-
ment."'" "Domestic slavery," Gouverneur Morris stated in the
Convention, "is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic
countenance of the proposed constitution."42 Thaddeus Stevens,
the scourge of the South, said that when the Founders came to
shape the "organic law, an institution hot from hell appeared
among them . . . . It obstructed their movements and all their
actions, and precluded them from making every human being
'equal before the law.' "4 That institution was slavery, as is writ
large in the Constitution itself. There was article I, section 9(1),
which Secretary Harris terms "the infamous but very real twenty-
one year prohibition of interference with the slave trade. ... "I'
The prohibition represented a compromise resulting, according to
Charles Pinckney, a delegate to the Convention, in a "compact"
that Congress would never "be authorized to touch the question
of slavery; that the property of the Southern States in slaves was
to be as sacredly preserved. . . as that of land, or any other kind
37. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 87.
38. P. HARRIS, supra note 1, at 487.
39. S. MoRIsoN, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 432-33 (1965).
40. K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 192-236 (1956).
41. Newmeyer, Book Review, 19 Am. J. LEGAL HiSm. 66, 67 (1975).
42. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 222.
43. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 88.
44. P. HARus, supra note 1, at 485-86.
[Vol. 30
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of property. . .. -'45 Article IV, section 2(3) called for delivery of
an escaped slave to the owner; when it later was sought to be
enforced in the North, it touched off shock waves." Secretary
Harris' critique illustrates the hazards, against which the emi-
nent British historians H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles cau-
tioned, of imposing "upon the past a creature of our own imagin-
ing."
47
It is a mistake to speak of "minority rights" as if they were
a "brooding omnipresence in the sky." "[W]ithin the State it-
self," Gouverneur Morris (closer to Hamilton's thinking than to
the masses), stated in the Convention, "a majority must rule,
whatever may be the mischief done among themselves."4 Justice
Johnson early in our history declared that "[i]t may be called
the ruling principle of the constitution, to interfere as little as
possible between the citizen and his own state government; and
hence, with a few safeguards. . . the States are left as they were,
as to their own citizens, and as to all internal concerns."49 Con-
versely, Madison stated in The Federalist No. 45 that the federal
powers "are few and defined" and "will be exercised principally
on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign com-
merce,"5 doubtless reflecting the popular impression of the pro-
posed federal government. Little did the people consider that the
framers had attempted to restructure the states' control of inter-
nal matters. That attempt was disclaimed by Hamilton in the
New York Ratification Convention: the "laws of the Union"
would not "new-model the internal police of any state . . ."I'
Such assurances testify to a pervasive anxiety that the federal
government might intrude into local concerns.
Secretary Harris' appeal to the Bill of Rights does not ad-
vance her case. First, she states that "specific guarantees of indi-
vidual liberty were omitted from the basic document only be-
cause it was believed they were adequately secured by the com-
45. 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 28, at 443.
46. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED:
ANTI-SLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
47. Richardson & Sayles, Parliament and the Great Councils in Medieval England -
, 77 LAw Q. REv. 213, 224 (1961); Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitu-
tional Adjudication, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 661, 673 (1960).
48. 2 M. FiARAND, supra note 28, at 439.
49. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 280-81 (1827).
50. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (J. Madison) at 303 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937) (emphasis
added).
51. 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTrrUTION 267-68 (2d ed. 1836).
1979]
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mon law."' 2 This, however, was not the "only" reason. Another,
Charles Pinckney explained, was that "[s]uch bills generally
begin by declaring that all men are by nature born free. Now, we
should make that declaration with a very bad grace, when a large
part of our property consists in men who are actually born
slaves."" Such a declaration is strikingly absent from the Bill of
Rights. 4 Then too, the Bill of Rights was designed to protect all
of the people against the federal government, not to protect a
minority against a "crushing majority," for the federal govern-
ment was widely regarded as a remote and suspect ruler.55 And
in great part it was meant to secure established procedures in
federal criminal prosecutions. One vainly searches the Bill of
Rights for words upon which to pin, for example, the right to vote
or to attend schools. Such matters were the province of the states.
In its inception, the Bill of Rights was aimed solely at the
federal government, not the states, as Chief Justice Marshall held
in 1833, and as the First Congress earlier had made clear.-" Pro-
tection of the individual against the state was provided by the
state's own bill of rights.7 Even free speech, regarded by Justice
Cardozo as "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly
every other form of freedom,"" was protected only against federal
interference. It has generally been overlooked that when Madison
urged in the First Congress, which drafted the Bill of Rights, that
the protection of free speech be extended to the states because
they were likely to be the worst offenders, his plea was rejected.
Jefferson, the great champion of free speech and free press, wrote
in 1804 to Abigail Adams, "While we deny that Congress have a
right to controul the freedom of the press, we have ever asserted
the right of the states and their exclusive right to do so."" So too,
Justice Story wrote in his landmark commentary on the Constitu-
tion that "the whole power over the subject of religion is left
52. P. HAuRs, supra note 1, at 486.
53. 3 M. FARRAND 256.
54. They are to be found in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, article 1 of the
Declaration of Rights: " 'all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain
natural rights.'" 2 B. POORE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS 1541
(2d ed. 1877). To the same effect is the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution, Declaration of
Rights, article 1. 1 POORE, id. at 957.
55. R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 31-33 (1969).
56. R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 134.
57. Id.
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exclusively to the state governments."6 The notion that the Bill
of Rights was adopted by or incorporated in the fourteenth
amendment by the four words "due process of law," borrowed
from the fifth amendment, is a fairly recent feat of judicial leger-
demain."
When Secretary Harris turns to the Civil War Amendments,
she speaks in generalities, lumping the thirteenth amendment,
which eliminated slavery, the fourteenth, which granted
"citizenship with due process protection," and the fifteenth,
which barred racial discrimination respecting the right to vote.
These amendments, she finds, "confirmed the constitutional pat-
terns of restricting the degree to which the majority might work
its will upon the minority. 6 2 The fourteenth amendment, as we
have seen, did not change the pattern of suffrage and segregation.
In truth, the framers sought only to secure the freed slaves from
renewed serfdom, from violence and oppression by means of a
narrow cluster of rights: to own property, to contract (mainly for
their services), and to have access to the courts. 3 The evidence
is too voluminous to detail here. Of course, the framers did not
"condone lynchings, [and] deprivations of fair trial," for these,
I demonstrated, were outlawed by the "privileges or immunities"
clause"4-and, before long, were aborted by the Supreme Court. 5
To go beyond these goals is to substitute wishful thinking for
historical fact. Thus Secretary Harris maintains that the framers
"could not, had they been able to predict the future, sanction the
development of a system of education of the black people into a
status of second-class citizenry, a result that mocked their effort
to confer on the ex-slaves the rights of free men.""6 But, as has
been noted, it was a limited "effort"; deplorable though it was,
the framers quite clearly rejected desegregation, being content to
leave to posterity the task of making further advances by amend-
60. J. STORY; COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrTTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1873, at
731 (1833).
61. R. BERGR, supra note 6, at 134-56; Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment
Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). Fairman "conclusively disproved
Black's contention [to the contrary], at least, such is the weight of opinion among disin-
terested observers." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 102 (1962); see Alfange,
Book Review, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 607 (1978); Perry, Book Review, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 685, 687-88 (1978).
62. P. HARMS, supra note 1, at 487.
63. See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
64. R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 20-36.
65. Id. at 37-51.
66. P. HARRMS, supra note 1, at 488.
1979]
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ment.7 To say that "[wihat was acceptable to the founding
fathers or to those who dealt with the constitutional issues just a
century ago would not be acceptable to them today had they been
given access to the knowledge available to us today,"68 is to read
current conceptions back into the minds of the framers, who used
words to express their purposes, not ours. It represents the very
thing dismissed by Justice Black as
rhapsodical strains, about the duty of the Court to keep the
Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Consti-
tution must be changed from time to time and that this Court
is charged with a duty to make those changes. . .The Constitu-
tion makers knew the need for change and provided for it by
[the article V provision for amendment]."9
With the help of a different rhetoric, Secretary Harris would have
the Court displace the choices of the framers with its own, under
the plea that the framers would have shared them were they here
today. If so, to follow in her path, they would have resorted to the
very machinery they set up-amendment.
Remains her comment that "the significance of the political
rights embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses
was clear from the beginning." 0 The right of blacks to be free
from discrimination with respect to voting was first recognized in
the fifteenth amendment, which contains no due process or equal
protection clauses. The framers of the fourteenth made quite
clear that "political rights" were excluded. Explaining how the
phrase "civil rights and immunities," in the Civil Rights Bill, was
subsequently watered down to "privileges or immunities," House
Chairman Wilson asked,
67. Thaddeus Stevens, who led the movement to strike the fetters from the freedmen,
stated that the amendment "falls far short of my wishes ... but ... is all that can be
obtained in the present state of public opinion... I... leave it to be perfected by better
men in better times." Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 106. He did not refer to
judicial expansion but to amendment, as the statement of Senator William Stewart makes
clear: the amendment "does not preclude Congess from adopting other means by a two-
thirds vote when experience shall have demonstrated the need for a change of policy," id.,
as it did in the fifteenth amendment with respect to suffrage.
68. P. HAmus, supra note 1, at 488.
69. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 101. Black also declared, "[Tihere is no
constitutional support whatever for this Court to use the Due Process Clause as though it
provided a blank check to alter the meaning of the Constitution as written so as to add to
it substantive constitutional changes which a majority of the Court at any given time
believes are needed to meet present-day problems." Id. at 264.
70. P. HARMs, supra note 1, at 489.
[Vol. 30
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What do these terms mean? Do they mean that in all things,
civil, social, political, all citizens, without distinction of race or
color, shall be equal? By no means can they be so construed...
I understand civil rights to be simply the absolute rights of
individuals, such as "The right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property."7'
Similar statements are too numerous to detail here.72 In a discus-
sion of the fourteenth amendment, for which he voted, James
Patterson of New Hampshire declared that he was opposed "to
any law discriminating against [blacks] in the security of life,
liberty, person, property and the proceeds of their labor. Those
civil rights all should enjoy. Beyond this I am not prepared to go,
and those pretended friends who urge political and social equality
• . . are. . . the worst enemies of the colored race."73 The chair-
man of the Joint Committee, Senator William Fessenden, stated,
"We cannot put into the Constitution, owing to existing preju-
dices and existing institutions, an entire exclusion of all class
distinctions. '" 74 Constitutional analysis must proceed from the
historical facts, not from present day crystal-gazing.
A few words should be said about the significance of the "due
process" and "equal protection" clauses. In one of the most illu-
minating statements in legal history, Alexander Hamilton stated
on the eve of the Convention: "The words 'due process' have a
precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process
and proceedings of the courts of justice. They can never be re-
ferred to an act of the legislature.-' 75 Hamilton summed up centu-
ries of historical association of "due process" with judicial proce-
dure. 76 No statement to the contrary will be found in any of the
records of the conventions in the First Congress that employed
"due process" in the fifth amendment, nor in the 39th Congress
that drafted the fourteenth. My chapter on due process shows
that the 39th Congress conceived of due process in traditional
71. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 27. In this statement of the limited objec-
tives of the Bill, Wilson was followed by other spokesmen. Id. at 27 n.26. See also id. at
27-31.
72. E.g., Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee
said: "The bill is applicable exclusively to civil rights. It does not propose to regulate
political rights of individuals; it has nothing to do with the right of suffrage, or any other
political right." Quoted in id. at 29.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 99.
75. THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 35 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962) (empha-
sis added); see R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 194.
76. R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 195-200.
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judicial procedure terms.77 Substantive due process is a judicial
construct fashioned out of whole cloth in the 1890's in order to
defeat socio-economic legislation. The Court itself has confessed
that it is discredited." Hamilton spoke of "legislation," all legis-
lation, not merely socio-economic legislation, so it is incumbent
upon apologists for the Warren Court to explain the magic
whereby legislation touching other rights reserved to the states by
the fourteenth amendment can be struck down under cover of due
process. No less a jurist than Learned Hand wrote that "[t]here
is no constitutional basis for asserting a larger measure of judicial
supervision over liberty than property. '79 In the due process
clause they are on a par.
My chapter on "equal protection of the laws" shows the fra-
mers associated that phrase with their purpose to prevent dis-
criminatory legislation with respect to the above-mentioned clus-
ter of rights." For example, Samuel Shellabarger, a leading Radi-
cal, said of the Civil Rights Bill that "whatever rights as to each
of these enumerated civil (not political) matters the State may
confer upon one race . . shall be held by all in equality ....
It secures equality of protection in these enumerated rights
... ,,81 In describing their aims, the framers interchangeably
referred to "equality," "equality before the law," and "equal pro-
tection," but always in the circumscribed context of the rights
enumerated in the Bill, thus wedding "equal protection" to those
enumerated rights." The judicial expansion of "equal protection"
is quite recent; the phrase was convenient because, as Professor
Gerald Gunther said, it "did not carry with it the bad reputation
that substantive due process had." 3 But as Professor Philip Kur-
land observed, it was simply the old "substantive due process";84
and in the words of Professor Gunther, the "bad legacy of sub-
stantive due process and of ends-oriented equal protection in-
volves a block to legislative ends, an imposition of judicial values
as to objectives" 8"-legislative policy-making.
77. Id. at 193-220.
78. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963).
79. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 267.
80. See id. at 266-68.
81, Quoted in id. at 170 (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 169-72.
83. Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 656
(1975).
84. Id. at 661. See also comment of Justice Douglas, id. at 649.
85. Id. at 665.
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Objections thereto are not new. Towards the close of his car-
eer, Justice Holmes expressed the "more than anxiety" he felt
because
[als the decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky
to the invalidating of [the constitutional rights of the states]
if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any reason
undesirable. I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended
to give us carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs
in its prohibitions.'
Chief Justice Stone wrote in 1945, "My more conservative breth-
ren in the old days [read their preferences] into the Constitution
• . . history is repeating itself. The Court is now in as much
danger of becoming a legislative and Constitution making body,
enacting into law its own predilections, as it was then.""7 His
forebodings were over-fulfilled. "The Warren Court," Professor
Archibald Cox averred, "behaved even more like a Council of
Wise Men and less like a Court than the laissez faire Justices."",
Whence does the Court derive the power to displace the
choices of the framers by its own, as when it ordained "one per-
son-one vote" notwithstanding suffrage was excluded from the
scope of the fourteenth amendment? The very institution of judi-
cial review is regarded by some as of doubtful provenance. Judge
Learned Hand, Professor Archibald Cox, and Professor Leonard
Levy consider the evidence that the framers provided for judicial
review as inconclusive. 81 While Hamilton assured the ratifiers
that of the three branches "the Judiciary is next to nothing,"9 it
is now enthroned as a super-legislature. The judges, however,
were emphatically excluded from tampering with policy. In the
Convention it was proposed that they be included in a Council
of Revision that would join with the President in the veto of
legislation, on the ground that "[laws may be unjust, may be
unwise, may be dangerous. . . and yet be not so unconstitutional
as to justify the Judges in refusing to give them effect."9' Mark
the distinction between legislation that is merely unjust or dan-
86. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 383.
87. Id. at 278.
88. Id.
89. L. HAND, THE Biu OF RJGHTS 15 (1958); R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 353, 355
n.16. Bickel stated Hand was "unwilling to rest on the historical evidence." A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 46 (1962).
90. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton) at 504 (Mod. Lib. Ed. 1937).
91. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 301.
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gerous and that which is unconstitutional. This was rejected be-
cause, as Nathaniel Gorham said, judges "are not to be presumed
to possess any peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public
measures, '"" because, in Elbridge Gerry's words, "[i]t was quite
foreign . . . [to] ye office to make them the judges of the policy
of public measures. . .. -'3 Then too, at the adoption of the Con-
stitution there was profound distrust of judicial discretion, epito-
mized in 1767 by Chief Justice Hutchinson of Massachusetts:
"the Judge should never be the Legislator: Because then the Will
of the Judge would be the Law: and this tends to a State of
Slavery."" In that era, "legal change" was brought about by leg-
islation.
It is time to acknowledge, as Justice Jackson vainly urged in
the desegregation case, that the Court "is declaring new law for
a new day."95 The first step, as Professor Ray Forrester urged, is
to be candid about it." "If," said Judge Learned Hand, "we do
need a third [and final legislative] chamber it should appear for
what it is, and not as the interpreter of inscrutable principles."9
And it should seek a warrant from the American people so to act.
Candor also requires acknowledgment that the judicial substitu-
tion of "one person-one vote" for the framers' exclusion of suf-
frage from the fourteenth amendment constitutes amendment,
not interpretation. Let us be clear that this is not a matter of
"strict construction," but of flouting the unmistakable intention
of the framers. Amendment is the exclusive prerogative of the
people by virtue of article V. Justice Black's dismissal "of the
duty of the Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the
times"98 is not popular with advocates of a "living Constitu-
tion,"99 but it stands rock-solid on the assurance of that great
proponent of judicial review, Alexander Hamilton: "Until the
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act annulled or
changed the established form, it is binding upon themselves...
and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can
warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 307.
95. Id. at 130.
96. Forrester, Are We Ready for Truth in Judging, 63 A.B.A.J. 1212 (1977).
97. Quoted in R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 416.
98. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
99. For comment on that incantation, see R. BERGER, supra note 6, at 373-79.
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an act."'' 0 Hamilton also rejected the notion "that the courts on
the pretence of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure
to the constitutional intentions of the legislature"; and he
stressed that Congress could impeach the judges for "deliberate
usurpations on the authority of the legislature."' "'
Finally, I would remind Secretary Harris of Washington's
caution in the Farewell Address:
If in the opinion of the People, the distribution or modification
of the Constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it
be corrected by an amendment in the way in which the Consti-
tution designates. But let there be no change by usurpation; for
though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it
is the customary weapon by which free governments are de-
stroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in per-
manent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can
at any time yield.' 2
100. Quoted in id. at 316.
101. Id. at 294.
102. Id. at 299.
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